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Abstract—The rapid development of cloud computing has probably benefited each of us. However, the privacy risks brought by
untrusty cloud servers arise the attention of more and more people and legislatures. In the last two decades, plenty of works seek the
way of outsourcing various specific tasks while ensuring the security of private data. Although the addition and multiplication are
enough for implementing any functions, the direct utilization of existing schemes like homomorphic encryption will lead to significant
efficiency and accuracy loss, which is not suitable for outsourcing computation tasks. The tasks to be outsourced are endless, however,
the involved calculations are similar. In this paper, inspired by additive secret sharing and multiplicative secret sharing technologies, we
construct a series of novel protocols which support the common secure calculations on numbers (e.g., basic elementary functions) or
matrices (e.g., solve eigenvectors) in arbitrary n number of servers (n ≥ 2), and the n-party protocols ensure the security of the
original data even if n− 1 servers collude. All protocols we designed only need constant interaction rounds, and we demonstrate them
under universally composability security. We believe that these protocols can provide a new basic tool for actual outsourced tasks.
Index Terms—secure computation protocols, additive secret sharing, multiplicative secret sharing, share-transform-reveal
F
1 INTRODUCTION
W ITH the rapid development of the Internet, we are allin the information explosion era. Ordinary hardware
equipment has been incapable of meeting our routine needs
in time. Cloud computing provides a perfect solution to this
dilemma. They offer powerful cloud servers, store the data,
and complete computing resource-intensive tasks for us. At
the same time, the mature network makes the real-time re-
quirements can be guaranteed. It seems quite nice, however,
the conveniences all come at the cost of our personal data
being exposed.
In recent years, a large number of privacy problems
caused by cloud servers [1] arouse widespread concern. In
this case, some government agencies have set up relevant
laws and regulations. A well-known example is General
Data Privacy Regulation [2] implemented in the European
Union, which clearly defines that the utilization of personal
data needs the consent of the data subject. The convenience
and privacy are both public demands, therefore, how to
complete the daily needs without leaking personal privacy
data becomes one of the most urgent problems nowadays.
There are mainly three kind of schemes focusing on
coping with secure computation outsourcing problem: dif-
ferential privacy [3], Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [4], and
Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) [5]. Schemes in differ-
ential privacy try to ensure security by adding reasonable
noise to the individual data but retain the valid statistical
information. However, the significant loss on the accuracy
or security [3] and task-related perturbation methods limit
their application scenarios.
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HE [4] is one of the most typical cryptography tools
which support direct computation on the ciphertext. Gener-
ally speaking, HE schemes based on one assumption of com-
putational intractability [6], which means the encryption
and computation process in their schemes always involve
operations on large prime numbers, and the raw data can
only appear as integers or bits. Therefore, schemes in this
category always cause unacceptable efficiency and a certain
degree of accuracy loss. Besides, such schemes are difficult
to directly support secure calculations more than linear
computation and multiplication.
The above two kinds of schemes can be supported by
a single cloud server which is necessary during the early
stage of cloud computing. However, after decades of de-
velopment, more and more cloud computing vendors are
willing to provide computation services. The service jointly
supported by multiple servers becomes a new possibility
and attracts many researchers in recent years. The utilization
of multiple servers provides a new stage for the traditional
SMC schemes [7], and the avoidance of HE makes recent
secure outsourced tasks [8], which utilize SMC technologies
[5], gain thousands of time efficiency advantage. Attracted
by the huge improvement, we try to expand this kind of
scheme in this work.
Additive secret sharing (ASS) which naturally supports
linear operations on ciphertext (i.e., share) is one typical
technology in SMC. As linear operations are usually the
most common operations in real-world tasks, ASS has re-
ceived great attention in schemes that consider outsourcing
secure computing tasks. However, most of the existing
schemes [9] still limit in classical conclusions gotten in
SMC. For example, utilizing Beaver triples [5] to execute
multiplication, and bit-decomposition [10] is used for com-
parison. In this case, they are fairly passive during facing
with more general operations widely existed in practical
tasks (e.g., non-linear functions).
Inspired by Multiplicative Secret Sharing (MSS), the re-
cent work [11] combines both ASS and MSS. By switching
between two kinds of sharing at the proper time, they
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implemented plenty of non-linear protocols based on two
non-collusion cloud servers and the introduction of MSS
greatly optimizes other existing protocols (e.g., comparison).
However, limited by the protocols they designed, there still
exists much room for improvement.
The greatest problem that exists in [11] is the assumption
of two non-collusion servers. It will lead to the following
deficiency naturally: the owner of data may not believe
that the two servers will not collude. For instance, the
development of federal learning [12] has led to the following
demand: plenty of different commercial organizations have
some valuable data, they hope to collaboratively train a
better model (e.g., neural network) without exposing their
data. In this case, it is hard to find two servers that can be
trusted by all the participants. More likely, all data providers
will insist on participating in the secure calculation as they
do not lack communication or computing resources.
The above demand urges us to consider a more general
scene: How to outsource computation losslessly to arbitrary n
cloud servers (n ≥ 2), and ensure the security of original data
even n − 1 cloud servers collude. We try to construct efficient
secure computation protocols for common functions on
numbers and matrices under the above security limitation.
In summary, we mainly make the following contributions:
1) Inspired by [11], follow the idea of share-transform-
reveal, we construct two novel resharing protocols
that support transforming share, which is stored in
n servers, in ASS format to that in MSS, and vice
versa. Then follow a series of identities, we construct
the secure n-party computation protocols on all basic
fundamental functions and remain the input and
output in ASS format. We also design the n-party
comparison and division protocols. As a theoretical
supplement, we also give the corresponding proto-
cols, which keep the input and output in MSS format,
in the appendix.
2) We further optimize and expand partial proto-
cols (e.g., comparison) at the cost of extremely
lightweight offline work undertaken by the data
owner. All n-party protocols designed only need
constant (i.e., irrelevant to n) rounds of interaction.
3) We further construct some common n-party compu-
tation protocols, such as solving eigenvectors and
eigenvalues, on matrices, and remain the input and
output in ASS format. The interaction rounds of
protocols on matrices are independent of their di-
mensions.
4) We prove the security of our protocols in the Uni-
versally Composability (UC) security model [13],
which shows that our protocols can against collusion
between n − 1 servers. We also analyze the commu-
nication complexity of all protocols proposed.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In section 2,
we briefly introduce some typical technologies in SMC. The
system and threat model will be given in section 3. Section
4 considers the resharing protocols which can transform
share in ASS and MSS format. Then section 5 constructs
all the basic elementary functions protocols in our system
model. More optimization, expansion and protocols on ma-
trices are considered in section 6. The security and efficiency
analysis of all designed protocols are shown in section 7
and section 8. Finally, we make the conclusion in section 9.
Some protocols designed for completeness are placed in the
Appendix.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we first briefly introduce the SMC, then focus
on secret sharing technology that is strongly related to this
work.
2.1 Secure Multiparty computation
Typical SMC schemes enable a group of participants col-
laboratively compute a certain function F(x1, x2, · · · , xn)
without revealing their private input xi, here n is the num-
ber of participants. SMC is firstly introduced by Yao [14]
to cope with the typical Two Millionaires Problem which is
essentially a secure comparison computation. After decades
of development, there are mainly two kinds of schemes still
attracts plenty of researchers: Garbled Circuits (GC) [15] and
Secret Sharing [11].
GC [16] introduced by Yao proposed a general scheme
for 2-party secure computation. Consider the OR gate on
one bit, which means there are four cases in the truth table,
and Alice and Bob hope to secretly compute it with their
private input. There are mainly three steps: Alice generates
the garbled circuit, the bits in all four potential case will be
encrypted with symmetric encryption and permutation; Bob
evaluate the garbled circuit gotten from Alice, and Bob can
secretly get the encrypted version of his input from Alice
with the help of oblivious transfer [17]; Bob shares the
evaluation results. When the circuit becomes more complex,
the values computed from the intermediate circuit will be
protected. Due to any discrete function can be composited
by basic gate circuits [18], which means GC can be widely
used in 2-party secure computation.
Although GC only needs constant rounds interaction,
however, there are two reasons that GC is not suitable
for outsourced computation in cloud computing. On the
one hand, the input and circuit will become much more
complex when facing a real outsourced task, which means
the communication size will grow significantly [6]. On the
other hand, for a GC scheme, each party owns their private
data and will get a knowledge (i.e., F ) after the evaluation.
However, in the scene of outsourced computation, data
owners do not want the servers to have private data or to
get the corresponding knowledge.
The second reason actually reflects the difference be-
tween the typical SMC scene and the outsourced computa-
tion scene. In this case, the secret sharing technology which
is more universal attracts more researchers in recent years.
2.2 Secret sharing
Secret sharing is first introduced by Shamir in [19], which
is earlier than SMC [14]. Briefly speaking, secret sharing
considers the way splitting secret into different shares
to meet the specific access structure [20]. Besides, how to
execute computation on secrets [21] by calculating on the
shares is also an important issue. Due to the characteristics
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of this technology, it is suitable for SMC naturally. For
instance, [7] utilized it and expand 2-party GC to n-party.
In [19], Shamir constructed a (k, n)-threshold sharing
scheme based on polynomial interpolation. Here (k, n)-
threshold means that the original secret can be shared
into n different part, and any k shares can reconstruct the
original secret, however, k − 1 shares can not get any
information of secret. It is quite useful as both security
and robustness are gotten, which can prevent the situation
that partial participants suffer from accidents. Please note
that the situation in outsourced computation tasks is quite
different. The robustness of the cloud server needs no worry,
however, the security of secret is quite unbelievable. In this
case, we actually need the (n, n)-threshold secret sharing
scheme. Interestingly, the ASS which may be the simplest
sharing method meets our demands.
2.2.1 Additive secret sharing
In ASS, the secret, e.g., x, will be splitted into n different
shares [[x]]i, i ∈ [1, n], here
∑n
i=1[[x]]i = x. From theorem 1,
the additive secret sharing is a (n, n)-threshold as the lack
of any share will make the information independent from
secret.
Theorem 1. The element x + r is uniformly distributed and
independent from x for any element x ∈ R if the element r ∈ R
is also uniformly distributed and independent from x.
Proof. If r ∈ R is uniformly distributed and independent
from x, then so is x + r, since fr(x) = r + x is a bijective
mapping for R.
It should be noted that ASS naturally supports linear
operation:
∑n
i=1(xi ± yi) = x ± y. It implies each party
can execute xi ± yi locally, and the result is also in the
additive. Similarly, each party can execute constant multi-
plication without interaction. In this paper, for simplicity
and generality, we focus on the secret in the infinite field
R. Although the actual computer is unable to cope with an
infinite field, let us put this problem on hold until subsection
8.3.
ASS does not have multiplication homomorphism,
which means the interaction is inevitable when executing se-
cure multiplication. Beaver [5] creatively proposed a scheme
which called Beaver triples, which introduce an offline
phase, to compute secure multiplication losslessly in one
interaction. We will introduce this fundamental protocol in
section 4.
Since the addition and multiplication can fit any other
basic computations, therefore, to our knowledge, few later
papers pay their attention to construct other losslessly basic
numerical calculation protocols (e.g., exponentiation). To
comparison protocol, as the Most Significant Bit (MSB)
implies the sign of number, plenty of schemes follow [22] try
to secretly compute the sign of share based on secure mul-
tiplication protocol [8] or more complex random numbers
[23] generated during offline phase. However, these schemes
either lead to O(l) rounds of interaction, here l is the bit-
length of secret, or cause too much work during offline phase.
The above deficiencies is essentially due to lack of
multiplication homomorphism. In this case, recent work
[11] introduces MSS which naturally owns multiplication
homomorphism and provides a new direction to cope with
the above problems.
Fig. 1: System model.
2.2.2 Multiplicative secret sharing
MSS can be seen as a symmetrical technology from the
perspective of ASS. In detail, for a secret x, it will be splitted
into n shares 〈x〉i, i ∈ [1, n], here
∏n
i=1〈x〉i. However, MSS
does not strictly satisfy the (n, n)-threshold property.
Theorem 2. The nonzero element xr is uniformly distributed
and independent from x for any element x ∈ R if the element
r ∈ R is also uniformly distributed and independent from x.
Proof. If r ∈ R\{0} is uniformly distributed and indepen-
dent from x, then so is xr, since fr(x) = r × x is a bijective
mapping for R\{0}.
From theorem 2, it is easy to infer that, unfortunately,
MSS is a (n, n)-threshold only in R\{0}. Consider the
secret equal to zero, then at least one party will have the
zero share, and the secret will be exposed to the party.
Although it is an inherent deficiency, however, we will show
that, basically, it will not influence the following protocols
construction.
As described above, MSS has an important property
that
∏n
i=1 xiyi = xy, which means each party can execute
multiplication without interaction. Although it is difficult
to find plenty of practical applications by multiplication
homomorphism alone, the combination of ASS and MSS will
let share has the property we want at the proper time.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, not limited to any specific outsourced task,
we focus on the common basic calculations on numbers or
matrices which are gotten from data owner. In detail, the
system model and security model are shown as follow.
3.1 System model
As a general model, the proposed system model involves
three kinds of entities, i.e., data owner, cloud servers and
data user. The system model is shown as Fig. 1.
Data owner owns the original data, in this paper, we
consider two commonest data types: number and matrix in
R. At the same time, we assume the data owner is trusty to
himself [24], and he will undertake the tasks of generating
random numbers or matrices during offline phase (i.e., before
secure computation).
Cloud servers undertake the computation tasks gotten
from the data owner. In this paper, we consider n different
servers Si, here i ∈ [1, n], n is a number not less than 2. We
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Algorithm 1 Secure multiplication protocol SecMul
Input: Si has [[x]]i, [[y]]i.
Output: Si gets [[xy]]i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates random numbers a, b ∈ R, then computes c
= ab.
2: T randomly splits (a, b, c) into n additive shares ([[a]]i,
[[b]]i, [[c]]i) and sends it to corresponding Si.
Online Phase :
3: Si computes [[e]]i = [[x]]i − [[a]]i and [[f ]]i = [[y]]i − [[b]]i.
4: Si collaboratively recover e and f .
5: Si computes [[xy]]i = [[c]]i + [[b]]ie + [[a]]if , S1 further
computes [[xy]]1 = [[xy]]1 + ef .
do not limit the actual number of servers as it is usually de-
termined by the specific task. Similarly, to avoid limitations,
we focus on the common computations on numbers and
matrices, rather than any specific task. By keeping the input
and output in the same format (e.g., ASS), plenty of tasks
[8], [9], [25], [26] can be executed losslessly by combining
our protocols simply.
Data user receives the share of results from each Si, and
recover the real results from the shared version. In many
cases, the data user is also the data owner.
3.2 Security model
In this paper, the honest-but-curious (also called passive)
cloud servers are considered. It means each server will
execute the protocol as the setting but may attempt to
analyze the information from data (i.e., share). As described
above, the risk that at most n − 1 servers collude is consid-
ered, please note that the secret without encryption will be
inevitably exposed when all the computational parties are
involved in the conspiracy, therefore, we actually consider
the worst collusion situation which maybe satisfies almost
all the real tasks.
4 RESHARING PROTOCOLS
4.1 Secure multiplication
Before considering how to transform share between ASS
and MSS, the secure multiplication on shares in ASS should
be considered. Actually, Beaver [5] has creatively given the
crucial solution in the 1990s. The kernel idea is introducing
an offline phase (i.e., before executing secure multiplication),
the triple {a, b, c|c = ab} should be pre-generated. Then
follow the identity
(x− a)(y − b) = xy − a(y − b)− b(x− a)− ab, (1)
the information of x and y will be covered (e.g., x−a) by the
triple, however, the share of xy will still be able to recover.
In detail, the process of secure multiplication in our system
model based on Beaver triples is shown as algorithm 1.
As described above, we assume the data owner will not
betray himself, therefore the owner of data can be seem as
trusty party T , and undertakes the task of generating ran-
dom numbers during offline phase. In SecMul, each server
has one additive share of x and y, then server will use ai
Algorithm 2 Secure multiplicative resharing protocol
SecMulRes
Input: Si has 〈x〉i.
Output: Si gets [[x]]i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates random nonzero number c ∈ R\{0}.
2: T randomly splits c into n additive shares [[c]]i and n
multiplicative shares 〈c〉i, then sends ([[c]]i, 〈c〉i) to Si.
Online Phase :
3: Si computes 〈α〉i = 〈x〉i〈c〉i .
4: Si sends the share 〈α〉i to all Sj , where j 6= i, then Si
computes α.
5: Si computes [[x]]i = α× [[c]]i.
and bi to cover its share, and expose the result e and f .
Then follow the formula 1, each server can use [[a]]i, [[b]]i
and [[c]]i to reconstruct additive share of xy from ef .
Although the computation of ef can be executed by any
server or all servers (e.g, each server computes 1nef ), for
simplicity and efficiency, we always assume S1 to undertake
these tasks in this paper. For consistency, all the security
proof of protocols will be shown in section 7.
4.2 Multiplicative resharing
Inspired by Beaver triples, to our knowledge, previous
work [11] first considered the way converting multiplicative
share to additive share in (2, 2)-threshold. Here is their idea:
following formula 1, consider two servers which have x and
y, which means S1 actually has x1 and x2, and S2 owns y1
and y2, which is different from the situation in SecMul. In
this case, [11] gives a novel allocation scheme of Beaver
triples: (a, [[c]]1) and (b, [[c]]2) will be sent to corresponding
server. It is valid in (2, 2)-threshold, however, this numerical
trick no longer exists in the (n, n)-threshold.
Besides the (n, n)-threshold property of MSS, theorem
2 also provides another useful information: if a nonzero
secret is multiplied with a random nonzero number, it
is impossible to infer the secret from the result. In this
case, we can manipulate additive and multiplicative format
with the help of ASS and MSS share of a nonzero random
number which is generated by T during offline phase. In
detail, the secure multiplicative resharing protocol is shown
in algorithm 2.
In SecMulRes, each server which has the multiplicative
share firstly secretly transforms xi to xc i, then reveal
x
c ,
and the servers can finally get additive share of x with
the help of [[c]]i. The key process can be called as STR
(Share-Transform-Reveal): on the one hand, transforming
the original private data to an irreversible number; on the
other hand, the desired results can be secretly gotten based
on known information.
4.3 Additive resharing
Previous work [11] constructs their additive resharing proto-
col based on the inverse process of multiplicative resharing,
which is also obviously invalid in the arbitrary (n, n)-
threshold situation. Besides, their scheme will lead to po-
tential information leakage risk. Symmetric to SecMulRes,
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Algorithm 3 Secure additive resharing protocol SecAddRes
Input: Si has [[x]]i.
Output: Si gets 〈x〉i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates random nonzero number c ∈ R\{0}.
2: T randomly splits c into n additive shares [[c]]i and n
multiplicative share 〈c〉i, then sends ([[c]]i, 〈c〉i) to Si.
3: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocol
uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
4: Si computes [[xc]]i = SecMul([[x]]i, [[c]]i).
5: Si sends the share [[xc]]i to S1.
6: Si computes 〈x〉i = 1〈c〉i , S1 further computes 〈x〉1 =
xc× 〈x〉1.
Algorithm 4 Secure comparison protocol SecCmp
Input: Si has [[x]]i, [[y]]i.
Output: Si gets sgn(x− y).
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocol
uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si computes [[α]]i = [[x]]i − [[y]]i.
3: Si collaboratively compute 〈α〉i = SecAddRes([[α]]i).
4: Si collaboratively recover sgn(α), which is also the sign
of (x− y).
we design a novel additive resharing protocol shown in
algorithm 3.
In SecAddRes, based on SecMul, servers firstly trans-
form the [[x]]i to [[xc]]i, then reveal xc, and each server
finally gets 〈x〉i with the help of 〈c〉i. Both SecMulRes and
SecAddRes are (n, n)-threshold scheme in R\{0}, however,
when secret equal to zero, it is inevitably as at least one
multiplicative share will equal to zero, which means the
corresponding server (e.g., S1) knows the secret. We will
show that it will not cause actual damage to further proto-
cols.
It should be noted that multiplicative share naturally
contains the sign of secret, in this case, the secure compari-
son protocol can be constructed shown in algorithm 4.
As shown in SecCmp, the sign of secret can be gotten
from signs of multiplicative shares. Especially, if one share
is zero, then the corresponding numbers are equal. Please
note that the servers will get the comparison result, rather
than one share [9], as the comparison result is always serv-
ing as control information. In this case, although benefiting
from SecAddRes, SecCmp will not expose more informa-
tion besides the size relationship under any inputs. We will
consider the better secure comparison protocol in section 6,
now let us turn our attention back to the basic elementary
functions.
5 PROTOCOLS ON BASIC ELEMENTARY FUNC-
TIONS
Interestingly, there are many additive resharing and multi-
plicative resharing naturally contained in the basic elemen-
tary functions, which makes the losslessly secure computa-
Algorithm 5 Secure exponentiation protocol SecExp
Input: Si has [[x]]i and public base number a. (a > 0, a 6= 1)
Output: Si gets [[ax]]i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocol
uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si computes 〈ax〉i = a[[x]]i .
3: Si collaboratively compute [[ax]]i = SecMulRes(〈ax〉i).
Algorithm 6 Secure logarithm protocol SecLog
Input: Si has [[x]]i and public base number a. (x > 0, a >
0, a 6= 1)
Output: Si gets [[logax]]i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocol
uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si collaboratively compute 〈x〉i = SecAddRes([[x]]i).
3: Si computes [[logax]]i = loga|〈x〉i|.
tion possible. In this section, the n-party secure computation
protocols, whose input and output are both in ASS format,
on all basic elementary functions are considered. With the
help of protocols on four fundamental operations, all ele-
mentary functions can be executed losslessly in theory.
5.1 Exponentiation and Logarithm
Secure exponentiation protocol tries to compute [[ax]]i←[[x]]i,
here a is a public base number. Follow the identity
a
∑n
i=1 xi =
∏n
i=1 a
xi , (2)
it is easy to note that the additive share of input will
directly become multiplicative share of the output after
each party executes exponentiation computation locally. The
corresponding protocol is shown as algorithm 5.
Generally speaking, the public base number is assumed
in the range (0, 1) ∪ (1,+∞) in plaintext domain. In this
case, ax is always over zero, which means the SecMulRes
will not face zero input. Therefore, SecExp can compute
exponentiation losslessly in the (n, n)-threshold.
The situation in logarithm computation, [[logax]]i←[[x]]i,
is quite symmetric. Follow the identity
loga
∏n
i=1 xi =
∑n
i=1 loga|x|i, (3)
the corresponding protocol is shown as algorithm 6.
In SecLog, to meet formula 3, the ASS of input will
be convert to MSS, then each server computes logarithm
computation locally, the result is just the additive share
of output. Since the x is assumed in (0,+∞), the above
protocol is losslessly in (n, n)-threshold.
5.2 Power
Secure power protocol tries to compute [[xa]]i←[[x]]i, here a
is a public number in R. The following identity
(
∏n
i=1 ui)
a =
∏n
i=1 u
a
i , (4)
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Algorithm 7 Secure power protocol SecPow
Input: Si has [[x]]i and public number a. (a is integer)
Output: Si gets [[xa]]i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocols
use and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si collaboratively compute 〈x〉i = SecAddRes([[x]]i).
3: Si computes 〈xa〉i = 〈x〉ai .
4: Si collaboratively compute [[xa]]i = SecMulRes(〈xa〉i).
should be noticed. However, when the a is a real number
(i.e., non-integer), the computation is a multivalued function
[27]. In this case, the complex number will be involved.
For continuity, the discussion of this case will be shown in
the appendix, here we only consider that a is integer. The
corresponding protocol is shown in algorithm 7.
Generally speaking, 00 is an undefined value, we believe
it should be dependent on the specific task (e.g., 1 or
raise wrong), and therefore we skip this situation. The key
problem is that when secret is zero, one server (e.g., S1) will
inevitably know that the real secret.
However, we believe the extreme situation is low-
destructive based on two reasons: on the one hand, the
power on zero is meaningless, it generally does not contain
extra information. For instance, the 0 in neural network is
basically gotten from ReLU function, in this case, the expo-
sure of 0 is inevitable and known by all servers naturally.
On the other hand, generally speaking, the multivariate
functions (e.g., SecMul) with known input (e.g., 0) will not
leak other share of inputs. We will demonstrate it in section
7, and it means the exposure of some rare secrets will not
infect others. Whatever, we believe that this situation is rare
and easy to handle in specific tasks.
As described above, the secure power protocol is depen-
dent on the property of MSS, it further implies that the
multiplication of multiple powers can also be computed
based on above protocol. Especially, there are two important
cases should arise our attention:
(i) Secure multiple multiplication protocol SecMultMul.
The protocol tries to compute [[
∏m
j=1 x
j ]]i←{[[xj ]]i}, where
j ∈ [1,m]. It is easy to notice that when m = 2, the
SecMul is enough. However, when m over 2, it will be
expensive to directly expand SecMul (shown in subsection
6.2.1). The corresponding protocol is shown as algorithm 8.
As described above, if one secret is zero, the other secrets
will not be exposed.
(ii) Secure division protocol SecDiv. This protocol, shown
in algorithm 9, tries to compute [[xy−1]]i from [[x]]i and [[y]]i,
similar, the computation result will expose when x equal to
zero. We will show how to optimize it in subsection 6.1.
5.3 Trigonometric Functions
Trigonometric functions involve sin, cos, tan, cot, csc and
sec. Since the later four functions can be gotten by combin-
ing the former two and SecDiv, and calculation of cos is
similar to sin, only the secure computation process on sin
is considered.
Algorithm 8 Secure multiple multiplication protocol
SecMultMul
Input: Si has {[[xj ]]i}, j ∈ [1,m].
Output: Si gets [[
∏m
j=1 x
j ]]i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocols
use and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si collaboratively compute 〈xj〉i = SecAddRes([[xj ]]i)
for all j ∈ [1,m].
3: Si computes 〈
∏m
j=1 x
j〉i =
∏m
j=1〈xj〉i.
4: Si collaboratively compute [[
∏m
j=1 x
j ]]i =
SecMulRes(〈∏mj=1 xj〉i).
Algorithm 9 Secure division protocol SecDiv
Input: Si has [[x]]i and [[y]]i. (y 6= 0).
Output: Si gets [[xy ]]i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocol
uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si collaboratively compute 〈x〉i = SecAddRes([[x]]i),
〈y〉i = SecAddRes([[y]]i).
3: Si computes 〈xy 〉i = 〈x〉i × 〈y〉−1i .
4: Si collaboratively compute [[xy ]]i = SecMulRes(〈xy 〉i)
For simplicity, we here assume that n is odd. In this case,
there exists the identity
sin(
∑n
i=1 θi) =∑
odd k≥1(−1)
k−1
2
∑
|A|=k(
∏
i∈A sinθi
∏
i/∈A cosθi).
(5)
It could be noted that the additive share of input can
be transformed into a series sum of multiplicative shares of
output. In this case, by algorithm 10, we can execute the
secure sine losslessly.
As shown in SecSin, since each multiplication in for-
mula 5 is combined by the sinθi or cosθi, here i takes all
the elements in [1, n] once and only once. In this case, each
term is actually a part of secret store in n servers under
MSS format. After transforming them to additive shares, the
[[sinθ]]i has been gotten. Please note that each term is a part
of true secret, which means even some parts (all parts are
impossible from the perspective of n− 1 servers due to the
property of formula 5) are zero, the secret is still secure. In
this case, we assert that SecSin can be computed losslessly
in (n, n)-threshold model.
5.4 Inverse Trigonometric Functions
The inverse trigonometric functions involves arcsin,
arccos, arctan, arccot, arcsec, arccsc, as each one could
compute from arctan under the transformation of input,
for instance, arcsin(x) = arctan( x√
1−x2 ). Therefore, we
here focus on the secure computation protocol on arctan:
[[arctan(x)]]i ← [[x]]i.
To our knowledge, there exists no identity could directly
transform input in ASS format to the output in ASS or
MSS format. In this case, we here construct the output that
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Algorithm 10 Secure sin protocol SecSin
Input: Si has [[θ]]i.
Output: Si gets [[sinθ]]i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocol
uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si computes
∏
i∈A sin[[θ]]i
∏
i/∈A cos[[θ]]i for all the po-
tential set A in formula 5, the results compose {〈f j〉i},
j ∈ [1, 2n].
3: Si collaboratively compute [[f j ]]i = SecMulRes(〈f j〉i)
for the whole {〈f j〉i}.
4: Si computes [[sinθ]]i =
∑2n
j=1[[f
j ]]i.
could meet our demand based on existing protocols in ASS.
Follow the identity
arctan(u) + arctan( x−u1+ux ) = arctan(x), (6)
where u × x−u1+ux should less than 1. The u × x−u1+ux will
not be equal to 1 for the u and x in R. If more than 1, then
±pi will be added based on the sign of u (or x−u1+xu ).
First, consider the arctan in (2, 2)-threshold model: two
server owns [[x]]1 and [[x]]2. Since we wish the server can
own u and x−u1+ux so that the output can be locally computed
and stored in ASS format. Therefore, the problem here is the
way of transforming the additive share of x to u and x−u1+ux
without leakage of x.
To achieve the above goal, the following process can be
executed: S1 generates a random number u; Si collabora-
tively compute the additive share of x − u and 1 + ux;
then the division will be secretly computed; finally, S1 sends
[[ x−u1+ux ]]1 to S2, and the transformation has completed. Due
to each server still know nothing on x, the above process
is a (2, 2)-threshold scheme, in this case, we should expand
the process to the (n, n)-threshold.
It is difficult to directly expand the formula 6, therefore,
we seek an alternative method: transform the computation
in (n, n)-threshold to (n − 1, n − 1)-threshold process. In
detail, n servers can be seem as two parts, through above
process, n − 1 servers get one share of arctan(x), and
the other server get another share. If above process leak
no information, then we could further decrease n − 1 to
n − 2, and until the (2, 2)-threshold. Based on the existing
protocols, the above process can be designed as shown in
algorithm 11 and 12.
Please note that algorithm 11 can be executed in parallel
as the inputs are pre-generated in SecArctan, the interac-
tion rounds are same to that in (2, 2)-threshold. Due to the
high communication consumption which is shown in table
1, as previous works [11], we still suggest using the Taylor
series in the scene which does not care about accuracy.
6 OPTIMIZATION AND EXPANSION ON PROTOCOLS
In the section 4, follow the idea of STR, we construct two
resharing protocol. The resharing between ASS and MSS
is quite useful when face non-linear functions (e.g., basic
elementary functions), as computing them will involve both
addition and multiplication homomorphism. However, for
Algorithm 11 One iteration of Secure arctan protocol
Input: Si has [[x]]i, Sj has [[u]]j . (i ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [2, n])
Output: S1 gets arctan( x−u1+xu ), Sj gets the [[u]]j .
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocols
use and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si computes [[x− u]]i = [[x]]i − [[u]]i, here [[u]]1 = 0.
3: Si collaboratively compute [[xu]]i = SecMul([[x]]i, [[u]]i).
4: Si collaboratively compute [[ x−u1+xu ]]i = SecDiv([[x −
u]]i, [[1 + xu]]i).
5: Sj sends [[ x−u1+xu ]]j to S1.
6: Si collaboratively compute SecCmp(SecMul([[ x−u1+xu ]]i,
[[u]]i), 1), here [[ x−u1+xu ]]j = 0.
7: If u × x−u1+xu more than 1, then S1 computes
arctan( x−u1+xu ) = arctan(
x−u
1+xu ) + sgn(
x−u
1+xu )pi.
Algorithm 12 Secure arctan protocol SecArctan
Input: Si has [[x]]i.
Output: Si gets [[arctan(x)]]i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocols
use and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si sets [[u1]]i = [[x]]i.
3: for l = 2 : n do
4: Sj generates random numbers [[ul]]j , j ∈ [l, n].
5: end for
6: for l = 1 : n− 1 do
7: Sj collaboratively computes algorithm 11 with input
[[ul]]j and [[ul+1]]j , j ∈ [l, n].
8: Sl gets the corresponding [[arctan(x)]]l.
9: end for
some multivariate functions (e.g., comparison), although it
is feasible to compute them as the above section shows, it
is unnecessary and these protocols will lead to the potential
risk when secret equals zero. In this section, we first op-
timize comparison and division protocol, then show how
to expand typical SecMul, and finally consider the way
constructing some efficient basic computation protocols on
matrices.
6.1 An optimization on comparison and division
As described in section 4, a nonzero secret multiple by a
random nonzero number, the result is still random. In this
case, follow the idea of STR, we further use random input
to ensure the security of secret, however, ensure the result
still has (or can secretly transform back to) the property
we want at the same time. To distinguish the protocols
designed to follow this idea, we add the suffix ”−STR”
in the corresponding protocols.
To comparison computation, we need to get the sign
of difference of two inputs. It should be noted that the
multiplication by a positive number will not change the
sign of the original number. Therefore, it is feasible to let T
provide a random positive number which directly attends
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Algorithm 13 Secure comparison protocol SecCmp-STR
Input: Si has [[x]]i, [[y]]i.
Output: Si gets sgn(x− y).
Offline Phase :
1: T generates a random positive number t, then computes
the additive share [[t]]i and sends to corresponding Si.
2: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocol
uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
3: Si computes [[α]]i = [[x]]i − [[y]]i.
4: Si collaboratively compute the [[tα]]i = SecMul(
[[t]]i, [[α]]i).
5: Si collaboratively recover tα, the sign of tα is equal to
sgn(x− y).
Algorithm 14 Secure division protocol SecDiv-STR
Input: Si has [[x]]i, [[y]]i (y 6= 0).
Output: Si gets [[xy ]]i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocol
uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si generates a random number [[t]]i.
3: Si collaboratively compute the [[tx]]i =
SecMul([[t]]i, [[x]]i), [[ty]]i = SecMul([[t]]i, [[y]]i).
4: Si collaboratively recover ty.
5: Si computes [[xy ]]i =
[[tx]]i
ty .
SecMul, and recover the results. The optimized comparison
protocol is shown in algorithm 13.
As described in subsection 4.3, the comparison will not
expose more information besides the size relationship of two
inputs. Similar, since the dividend can not equal to zero, a
better division protocol is designed as algorithm 14.
Since two numbers which multiple the same random
nonzero number, the ratio between them will not change.
The SecDiv-STR is valid, and the reveal of ty will not lead
to information leakage due to theorem 2. As only ASS is
involved, SecDiv-STR is a (n, n)-threshold scheme in R.
Further, the trigonometric functions are all (n, n)-threshold
schemes in R.
The protocols (e.g., SecArctan) designed in section
5, which involves these two computation, can be directly
optimized. Please note that the efficiency analysis in section
8 will follow the optimized version.
6.2 Expansion on multiplication
6.2.1 Multiplication on three numbers
SecMul can be executed in one interaction, however, the
SecMultMul, with the help of MSS, will involve three
rounds of interaction. Is it possible to execute secure mul-
tiplication on multiple numbers in only one interaction?
We will use multiplication on three numbers to discuss the
problem in this subsection.
Let us see formula 1 from the following perspective: with
the help of (x−a) and (y− b), the computation of xy can be
replaced by ab, in other word, the difficulty of multiplication
on secrets is undertaken by T during offline phase. Consider
Algorithm 15 Secure multiplication on three number
Input: Si has [[x]]i, [[y]]i, [[z]]i.
Output: Si gets [[xyz]]i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates random numbers a, b, c ∈ R.
2: T randomly splits (ab, ac, bc, abc) into n additive shares
([[ab]]i, [[ac]]i, [[bc]]i, [[abc]]i) and sends it to corresponding
Si.
3: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocol
uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
4: Si computes [[e]]i = [[x]]i− [[a]]i, [[f ]]i = [[y]]i− [[b]]i, [[g]]i =
[[z]]i − [[c]]i.
5: Si collaboratively recover e, f , and g.
6: Si collaboratively compute SecMul([[bc]]i, [[x]]i),
SecMul([[ac]]i, [[y]]i), SecMul([[ab]]i, [[z]]i).
7: Si computes [[xyz]]i = [[acy]]i + [[bcx]]i + [[abz]]i - 2[[abc]]i.
8: S1 computes [[xyz]]1 = [[xyz]]1 + efg.
the situation that multiplication on three secrets, the T
needs to generate enough random numbers which could
replace xyz. The detailed process is shown in algorithm 15.
As algorithm 15 shows, with the help of acy, bcx, abz,
and abc, the xyz can be extracted from efg. Since ab, ac, and
bc can be generated by T , which means line number 5 and
7 can be executed in parallel, therefore, the protocol only
needs one interaction. The kernel process of the algorithm
is excluding the term, like axy, by e, f , and g, in that the
computation of axy is still a multiplication on three secrets.
Please note that the exclusion method is always existing,
which means multiplication on n numbers can be executed
in one interaction with the help of multiplication on n − 1
numbers.
However, as the communication size will increase sig-
nificantly (i.e., O(n!)), we only suggest using above method
on three secrets; the SecMul is suitable for facing four
secrets; SecMultMul is still suggested during meeting
more secrets.
6.2.2 Dot production
For simplicity, we only consider the d×d squared matrices in
this paper. Please note that the common operations, which
are valid in plaintext domain, on non-square matrices can
be designed similarly.
The addition and subtraction of matrix is just the com-
position of the number, the matrix multiplication (i.e., dot
production) can also be composed by multiplication on
numbers, which means it can be designed shown in algo-
rithm 16.
Due to (X1 + X2) · Z = X · Z , the dot production
has similar property of constant multiplication. In this case,
inspired by Beaver triples, previous work [25] constructed
SecMatMul from the perspective of matrices, here we fur-
ther extend it to (n, n)-threshold as shown in algorithm 17.
It is easy to notice that SecMatMul2 is similar to
SecMul, however, the dot production replaces multipli-
cation. Due to plenty of optimization on matrices, when
facing matrices in high dimension, there has some potential
efficiency advantage [26]. However, in SecMatMul2, the
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Algorithm 16 Secure matrix multiplication protocol
SecMatMul1
Input: Si has [[Xd×d]]i, [[Y d×d]]i.
Output: Si gets [[Zd×d]]i, Z = X · Y .
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocol
uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si computes [[xyjkl]]i = SecMul([[xjk]]i, [[ykl]]i) for all
j, k, l ∈ [1, d] in parallel, where x and y is the corre-
sponding value in X and Y .
3: Si computes [[zjl]]i by computing
∑k=d
k=1[[xyjkl]]i for all
j, l ∈ [1, d], where z is the corresponding value in Z .
Algorithm 17 Secure matrix multiplication protocol
SecMatMul2
Input: Si has [[X]]i, [[Y ]]i.
Output: Si gets [[X · Y ]]i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random vectors to compose A, B
and computes C=A·B.
2: T randomly splits (A, B, C) into two additive share
([[A]]i, [[B]]i, [[C]]i) and sends the share to corresponding
server Si.
Online Phase :
3: Si computes [[E]]i = [[X]]i−[[A]]i and [[F ]]i = [[Y ]]i−[[B]]i.
4: Si collaboratively recover E and F .
5: Si computes [[X · Y ]]i = E · [[B]]i + [[A]]i · F − [[C]]i, S1
further computes [[X · Y ]]i = [[X · Y ]]i + E · F .
data owner needs to ensure the dimension of secret in offline
phase, which maybe impossible in some cases. For simplic-
ity, we will use SecMatMul to represent SecMatMul1 or
SecMatMul2 in the following.
6.3 Secure computation on matrix
Similar to SecMatMul1, generally speaking, the operations
on the matrix can be composed by the calculations on
numbers. However, the direct simulation always causes
O(d) rounds of interaction as most operations can not be
executed in parallel. To cope with the problems on matrices,
we should consider the operation from the view of matrices
like SecMatMul2. In this paper, we focus on the following
two basic demands on matrices: Compute matrix inversion,
Compute eigenvalue and eigenvector. Similar to the operations
on numbers, we also consider the dot production on multi-
ple matrices.
6.3.1 Matrix inversion
Following the idea of STR, inspired by [28], to avoid the
inversion computation on shares, we first transform the
original secret to an irreversible matrix, and compute the
inversion of the new matrix, and finally transform it back to
the true result. The detailed process is shown in algorithm
18.
As shown in SecMatInv, each server randomly gener-
ates an additive share of Z for transforming the secret X .
Due to (Z ·X)−1 ·∑ni=1 Zi = X−1, the inverse computation
Algorithm 18 Secure matrix inversion protocol SecMatInv
Input: Si has [[Xd×d]]i.
Output: Si gets [[X−1]]i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers or vectors the
sub-protocol uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si generates a random matrix [[Zd×d]]i.
3: Si collaboratively compute the [[ZX]]i =
SecMatMul([[Z]]i, [[X]]i).
4: Si collaboratively recover Z · X , then Si computes
(ZX)−1.
5: Si computes [[X−1]]i = (Z ·X)−1 · [[Z]]i.
Algorithm 19 Secure multi-matrices dot protocol
SecMultMatMul
Input: Si has {[[Xj ]]i}, j ∈ [1,m].
Output: Si gets [[
∏m
j=1X
j ]]i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers or vectors the
sub-protocol uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si generates some random matrices [[Zj ]]i, j ∈ [0,m].
3: Si collaboratively compute the [[(Zj)−1]]i for j ∈ [0,m].
4: Si collaboratively compute [[T j ]]i = SecMatMul(
SecMatMul( [[(Zj−1)−1]]i, [[Xj ]]i), [[Zj ]]i) for j ∈ [1,m].
5: Si collaboratively recover {T j}, j ∈ [1,m].
6: Si computes T =
∏m
j=1 T
j .
7: Si collaboratively compute [[
∏m
j=1X
j ]]i = SecMatMul(
[[(Z0)]]i · T, [[(Zm)−1]]i).
of X can actually substitute by inversion of Z · X , two
times of SecMatMul and the random matrix Z ensure
the security and efficiency. Please note that it is almost
impossible that Z is not full rank (i.e., the probability is zero
if the numbers are inR), and it can be detected and remedied
by computing the rank of Z · X . Following SecMatInv,
the secure dot production on multiple matrices is shown in
algorithm 19.
In SecMultMatMul, a series of matrices {Zj} will be
generated to cover secrets, here j is in the range [0,m],
which is one more than the number of matrices to be
processed. To avoid the difficulty of multiple dot production
on shares, the inversion of {Z} is computed. As shown in
line number 6, the dot production will remove the {Zj},
where j is in the range [1,m−1]. In this case, the real shares
of secret can be transformed back with the help of Z0 and
(Zm)−1.
6.3.2 Solve eigenvalue and eigenvector
The solutions of eigenvalue or eigenvector in plaintext do-
main (e.g., QR decomposition) always need to iterate the
corresponding matrix multiple times, which means that the
solution, from the perspective of numbers, in the encrypted
domain may cause O(d) interaction rounds and unneces-
sary precision loss. In this case, follow the idea of STR, to
avoid the difficulty of solving eigenvalues and eigenvectors
on shares, the following lemmas should be noticed:
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Algorithm 20 Secure eigenvalue and eigenvectors solution
Input: Si has [[Xd×d]]i.
Output: Si gets one share of eigenvalues {[[λj ]]i}, one share
of eigenvectors [[V d×d]]i, here j ∈ [1, d].
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers and vectors the
sub-protocols use and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si generates a random square matrix [[P d×d]]i and a
random number [[t]]i.
3: Si collaboratively compute [[P−1]]i = SecMatInv(
[[P ]]i).
4: Si collaboratively compute [[ 1t ]]i = SecDiv(1, [[t]]i).
5: Si collaboratively compute [[Y ]]i = SecMul([[t]]i,
SecMatMul([[P−1]]i, SecMatMul( SecMatMul( [[XT ]]i,
[[X]]i), [[P ]]i))).
6: Si sends [[Y ]]i to S1, then S1 computes the eigenvalues
{tλj} and eigenvectors of Y , and sends back to all Si.
7: Si computes [[λj ]]i = [[ 1t ]]i × tλj for all j ∈ [1, d].
8: Si computes [[V ]]i = [[P ]]i · Y .
Lemma 1. If A and B are similar matrices (i.e., A ∼ B), and
B = P−1AP , then A and B have the same eigenvalues; If there
is an eigenvector ~x under eigenvalue λ of matrix A, then P−1~x
is an eigenvector of B under eigenvalue λ.
Lemma 2. If λ is an eigenvalue of matrix A, then k × λ is
an eigenvalue of matrix k ×A; If there is an eigenvector ~x under
eigenvalue λ of matrix A, then the eigenvector ~x is also under
eigenvalue k × λ of matrix k ×A.
The detailed process of solving eigenvalues and eigen-
vectors is shown in algorithm 20. A random matrix P and
a random number t will be generated to cover the secret
X . The matrix Y with eigenvalues in a constant scaling
and similar eigenvectors will be computed and recovered
in line number 3 to 6. With the help of t and Z , the
share of eigenvalues and eigenvectors of X can be secretly
transformed back.
7 SECURITY ANALYSIS
We prove the security of our protocols under the framework
of universal composability framework [13]. The execution
of our schemes mainly involves the interaction between
servers, and the interaction process is defined as the real
experiment. Here, for simplicity, we directly consider the
extreme situation, which means n − 1 parties attend the
collusion. To prove that a protocol is secure, it suffices to
show that the view of corrupted party (i.e., arbitrarily n− 1
servers) is simulatable. We assume that Sn does not attend
the collusion for simplicity.
In the ideal experiment, the simulator S is defined as
the one that can simulate the view of the corrupted party
with the help of functionality F . In this paper, we define
F as follows. In the honest-but-curious model, F owns the
true input information of each protocol, and generates the
random numbers or matrices locally, then completes the
calculation as subprotocols. The corresponding view of S
will be filled by the calculation results. In the following,
we will prove that the view is indistinguishable to that
in the real world, and the view will not expose the input
information. To simplify the proofs, the following Lemma
will be used.
Lemma 3. [29] A protocol is perfectly simulatable if all its
sub-protocols are perfectly simulatable.
Theorem 3. The protocol SecMul is secure in the honest-
but-curious model.
Proof. The view of adversary during executing SecMul
is {[[x]]j}, {[[y]]j}, {[[a]]j}, {[[b]]j}, {[[e]]i}, {[[f ]]i}, where i ∈
[1, n], j ∈ [1, n − 1]. As described in theorem 1, the recover
of x needs [[x]]n. Here {[[a]]j}, {[[b]]j} are uniformly random
which is simulatable. Due to lack of [[a]]n, the [[e]]n is also
totally random which is simulatable. Therefore, the above
information can not infer any information of x. The situation
of y is similar, and the uniformly random view also leads
to uniformly random output which is independent from
the input. Therefore, both view and output are simulatable
by the simulator S and the views of S and A will be
computationally indistinguishable. It is easy to note that any
n− 1 conspiracies will lead to the same situation.
The SecMatMul1 is secure based on Lemma 3; algo-
rithm 15 and SecMatMul2 can be proven in a similar way.
Therefore, we omit their proofs for simplicity.
As both ASS and MSS are (n, n)-threshold in R\{0},
which means the view computed by n − 1 conspiracies
locally is obviously random and simulatable, in this case,
in the following proof, we focus on the view brought by the
communication with the non-conspiracy party (i.e., Sn).
Theorem 4. The protocol SecMulRes with nonzero input is
secure in the honest-but-curious model.
Proof. The view brought by communication is view =
(〈α〉n). Follow theorem 2, due to lack of 〈c〉n, it is impossible
to infer 〈x〉n) from 〈α〉n). In this case, the view is simulat-
able and computationally indistinguishable.
Please note that when secret equal to zero, then the
adversary can infer it from 〈x〉1.
Theorem 5. The protocol SecAddRes with nonzero input is
secure in the honest-but-curious model.
Proof. Besides those brought by SecMul, the view
brought by communication is view = (xc). Follow theo-
rem 2, due to lack of c, it is impossible to infer x from
xc. Therefore, the view is simulatable and computationally
indistinguishable.
Please note that when secret equal to zero, then the
adversary can infer it from xc. Similarly, the security of
SecCmp can be proven, please note that if the difference of
inputs to be compared is zero, the protocol will only reveal
that their equality, the true value information is still secure.
Theorem 6. The protocols SecExp, SecLog are secure in
the honest-but-curious model.
Proof. The above protocols are all only involves
SecMulRes, SecAddRes, and the input of SecMulRes is
in R\{0}. Therefore, these protocols are secure based on
Lemma 3.
Theorem 7. The protocols SecPow, SecDiv,
SecMultiMul are secure in the honest-but-curious model.
Proof. SecPow only involves SecMulRes and
SecAddRes, and the nonzero input will not lead to
zero input of SecMulRes. Therefore, SecPow is secure
based on Lemma 3.
Please note that when secret equal to zero, then the
adversary can infer it from 〈x〉1.
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Theorem 8. The protocols SecCmp-STR, SecDiv-STR are
secure in the honest-but-curious model.
Proof. To SecCmp-STR, the view brought by the com-
munication is view = (tα), as t is a random non-zero
number, in this case, follow theorem 2, besides the size
relationship, any information of x, y and x−y will be secure.
To SecDiv-STR, the corresponding view is (ty), as both t
and y is nonzero, any information of x and y will not be
exposed.
Theorem 9. The protocol SecArctan is secure in the
honest-but-curious model.
Proof. As the algorithm 12 is the repeat of algorithm 11,
we here focus on the proof of algorithm 11. If S1 does
not attend conspiracy, then the security can be directly
proven based on Lemma 3. Consider only Sn is not the
conspirator, in this case, the corresponding view brought
by communication is view = ( x−u1+xu ). Due to the lack of xn
and un, the information of x−u1+xu can not infer two unknown
numbers. In this case, the simulator S for the adversary can
simulate this random information.
Theorem 10. The protocols SecMatInv-STR,
SecMultMatMul are secure in the honest-but-curious model.
Proof. Besides those brought by SecMatMul, the view
brought by communication is view = (ZX). Due to lack of
information of Z , any full-rank matrix in the corresponding
size is potential X , which means X is uniformly random
and simulatable. Similar, to SecMultMatMul, any corre-
sponding size full-rank matrix is the potential T .
Theorem 11. The protocols for solving eigenvectors and
eigenvalues are secure in the honest-but-curious model.
Proof. Besides the view brought from SecMatInv,
SecDiv, SecMul, SecMatMul, the view brought by com-
munication is view = (Y ). Due to the lack of P and t, any
full-rank matrix in the corresponding size will be potential
X , which means it is random and simulatable. However,
the ratio of eigenvalues and a similar matrix of eigenvectors
will be exposed. Please note that, generally speaking, this
fuzzy information will not affect specific tasks.
Now we prove that for secure pluralistic functions, gen-
erally speaking, the known (e.g., exposed) input will not
lead to exposure of unknown inputs.
Theorem 12. The SecMul will not expose unknown secret
when the other is known.
Proof. Considering the exposed y, as the view related to
x (i.e., e) is covered by a, which is irrelevant to y, therefore,
the x will not be influenced by the exposed x.
The proofs for SecMultMul, algorithm 15,
SecMatMul, SecMultMatMul are similar and we
omit them for simplicity.
Theorem 13. The SecDiv and SecDiv-STR will not
expose unknown secret when the other is known.
Proof. To SecDiv, as all views related to x or y are
brought by SecAddRes and SecMulRes independently, the
unknown secret is secure. To SecDiv-STR, consider the
exposed y, due to the ty is recovered, the t is exposed to
each server. However, follow theorem 12, the information of
x is still secure; consider the exposed x, follow theorem 12,
the conspirators can not infer t, in this case, the information
of y is still secure.
Theorem 14. The SecCmp and SecCmp-STR will not
expose unknown secret if it is not equal to the known input.
TABLE 1: Communication complexity of protocols
Protocol Rounds Comm(bits)
SecMul 1 2n(n− 1)l
SecMulRes 1 n(n− 1)l
SecAddRes 2 (2n+ 1)(n− 1)l
SecCmp 3 (2n+ 1)(n− 1)l + n(n− 1)
SecExp 1 n(n− 1)l
SecLog 1 (2n+ 1)(n− 1)l
SecPow 3 (3n+ 1)(n− 1)l
SecMultiMul 3 (mn+ 2n+ 1)(n− 1)l
SecDiv 3 (4n+ 1)(n− 1)l
SecSin,cos 1 n(n− 1)2n−1l
tan,cot 3 n(n− 1)(2n + 5)l
csc,sec 3 n(n− 1)2n−1l + 5n(n− 1)l
arctan 6 (7n3 + n
2
2
− 15n
2
)l
arcsin,arccos 12 (7n3 + 21n
2
2
− 33n
2
− 1)l
arcsec 10 (7n3 + 11n
2
2
− 23n
2
− 1)l
arccsc 12 (7n3 + 17n
2
2
− 29n
2
− 1)l
arccot 8 (7n3 + 7n
2
2
− 21n
2
)l
SecCmp-STR 2 3n(n− 1)l
SecDiv-STR 2 5n(n− 1)l
SecMatMul 1 2n(n− 1)d2l
SecMatInv 2 3n(n− 1)d2l
SecMultiMatMul 6 (m+ 9)n(n− 1)d2l
SecEigenvec 7 (11n+ 2)(n− 1)d2l
SecEigenval 7 (11n2 − 10n− 1)d2l + (3n2 − 3n+ 1)dl
Proof. To comparison operation, as discussed above, only
the size relationship between two inputs will be exposed to
each server. In this case, if they are equal, the exposure of
unknown secret is inevitable. However, please note that, on
the one hand, generally speaking, the server can know zero
secret, which is rare; on the other hand, the comparison
calculation in specific tasks is generally used to make a
choice, which means the equality situations are few and
meaningless.
As proven in Theorem 12 to 14, the exposure of zero
secret brought by MSS will not expose other secrets except
the extreme situation during comparison.
8 EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
8.1 Communication complexity of our protocols
We summary the rounds and communication size of the
above protocols as shown in Table 1, here m means the
number of numbers or matrices, d represents one dimension
of the squared matrix. The protocols listed are all lossless,
and it could be seen the interaction rounds are all irrelevant
to the bit-length of share or the dimension of the matrix.
Here the communication size is the sum of all servers.
The complexity of SecMultiMul is related to m as
all the number participated need to be transformed into
MSS format. The trigonometric functions, such as SecSin,
need to execute SecMulRes on each sub-item, therefore,
the complexity of communication size is related to 2n. To
SecArctan, since our scheme needs to execute algorithm
11 n− 1 times in parallel, the complexity of communication
size reach O(n3). Please the SecCmp-STR, SecDiv-STR
and algorithm 15 are both utilized in optimizing algorithm
11. The other inverse trigonometric functions, since appro-
priate initial conversions are needed, the communication
size is slightly increasing. The high communication con-
sumption implies that the Taylor series is feasible for the
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TABLE 2: Comparison of communication complexities.
Scheme SecCmp SecDivRounds Comm(bits) Rounds Comm(bits)
[30] 1
2
lm 30lm+ 32l - -
[10] 15 279l + 5 - -
[8] l + 3 10l − 2 - -
[11] 3 2l + 2 3 6l
Ours 2 6l 2 10l
scenes which do not make excessive demands on accuracy.
The complexity of other protocols is easy to infer from the
description of algorithms.
8.2 Comparison on protocols
As described above, to our knowledge, few works in SMC
pay their attention to computing nonlinear computation
losslessly. In this case, we here only give the comparison on
SecCmp and SecDiv as shown in table 2. In table 2, n is set
as 2 to get the same security level with the other papers. It
is easy to note that our scheme has better interaction rounds
compared to past works.
8.3 Remark
In the above, we analyze the protocols on the R, however,
real computers can only process the data in a finite field, like
Z2l , where l is the bit-length (e.g., 64). It gives two strong
limitations: the computer can only cope with floating-point
numbers with finite precision; the computer can only cope
with the number in certain range size.
To the first limitation, please note that most of the
outsourced tasks have strong robustness, for instance, for
a classification task, the error caused by computer precision
is always too low (e.g., 10−8) to affect the label. Besides,
the drawback can be remedied to some extent by scaling
original data up to several times. Previous work [26] also
proved that the error caused by ASS is too weak to affect
the retrieval accuracy, even after the process of inference
of convolutional neural network and principal component
analysis.
To the second limitation, please note that, generally
speaking, a modern machine can support the floating num-
ber in the range [2−64, 264). The range is enough to contain
the secret and cover its range. To avoid share over the
range, the servers can execute the following process: when
an additive share is over the range 232, then the server
subtracts 231, and the other servers collaboratively add the
fixed value. In this case, the servers can always seek the
reasonable share as long as the secret is in the reasonable
range. It is easy to note that the frequency of this problem
depends on the range of random numbers, which is easy to
control.
Besides, the finite field F also makes the above protocols
which need servers generate the random numbers have
1/|F| possibility invalid. However, it is still negligible and
detectable. Whatever, for the high performance machine, the
problem drawn by precision and range is too weak. And the
other functional encryption methods, e.g., HE, will be more
affected due to their theoretical limitations. Therefore, we
assert our scheme is feasible and efficient in the real world.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we focus on the outsourced computation
problem, with the help of secret sharing technology, we
construct a series of fundamental computation protocols on
numbers or matrices. We do not limit the number (e.g., n)
of participating servers, and ensure the security of original
data even n−1 servers collude. We believe that the protocols
provide a potential new tool for plenty of secure outsourced
tasks in cloud computing. Due to the universality of secret
sharing technology, the traditional SMC tasks will also ben-
efit from these schemes to some extent.
We believe there are still existing many meaningful and
challengeable problems related to this work as follows:
1) How to let servers undertake the tasks in offline phase
in security?
2) Are there more efficient protocols? How to design
more secure and extensive protocols on matrices?
How to cope with the security problems in the
malicious model?
3) Is there any secret sharing technology that can fix
the drawback of MSS which brought by zero secret?
How to combine it with ASS?
4) How to decrease n to 1?
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APPENDIX
9.1 Power with real exponent
When the exponent a is in the Q, the power function will
become a multivalued function. However, in the real task,
we believe only the principal value is the desired result.
Therefore, when the base number is positive, we here solve
the corresponding principal value. However, when the base
number is negative, the complex number will be inevitably
involved. Whatever, it is a problem that should be defined in
the specific task, in this paper, with the help of the identity
uα = (−1)α|u|α, (7)
where u is negative, the detailed choice of value can be
shifted to the choice of (−1)α and the solution can be
defined in the specific task (e.g., define (−1) 13 = −1). The
detailed protocol is shown in algorithm 21.
Algorithm 21 Secure Power with Rational Exponent proto-
col SecPRE
Input: Si has [[x]]i and a public rational exponent a. (x 6= 0)
Output: Si gets [[xa]]i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocols
use and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si collaboratively compute SecCmp([[x]]i, 0) to judge the
sign of x.
3: Si collaboratively compute 〈x〉i = SecAddRes([[x]]i).
4: Si computes 〈|x|a〉i = |〈x〉i|a.
5: Si collaboratively compute [[|x|a]]i = SecMulRes(
〈|x|a〉i).
6: S1 compute [[xa]]1 = (−1)a × [[|x|a]]1 if x is negative.
The communication rounds is 5, the communication size
is (6n+ 1)(n− 1)l. A common case in this category is com-
puting the positive square root, in this case, the base number
is positive naturally, and the communication rounds and
size will decrease to 3 and (3n+ 1)(n− 1)l.
9.2 Basic computations built on multiplicative share
The input and output of the following protocols are all
in MSS format. Due to the inherent defects of MSS, these
protocols are (n, n)-threshold in R\{0}
9.2.1 Secure Addition and subtraction
Algorithm 22 Secure addition/subtraction protocol
SecAdd/SecSub
Input: Si has 〈x〉i, 〈y〉i.
Output: Si gets 〈x± y〉i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocols
use and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si collaboratively compute [[x]]i = SecMulRes(〈x〉i),
[[y]]i = SecMulRes(〈y〉i).
3: Si collaboratively compute 〈x ± y〉i = SecAddRes(
[[x]]i + [[y]]i).
During executing addition/subtraction, the servers first
transform the multiplicative share to additive share and
transform back after the addition.
9.2.2 Secure Comparison
Although the sign of multiplicative share directly reflects the
sign of secret, however, the subtraction before comparison
will make extra consumption which is more than that in
additive share.
Algorithm 23 Secure comparison protocol SecCmp-Mul
Input: Si has 〈x〉i, 〈y〉i.
Output: Si gets size relationship between x and y.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocols
use and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si collaboratively compute 〈x − y〉i =
SecSub(〈x〉i, 〈y〉i).
3: Si sends the sign of 〈x− y〉i to all other Sj , where j 6= i.
The sgn(x− y) = ∏ni=1 sgn(〈x− y〉i)
9.2.3 Secure exponentiation and logarithm
The situation in the exponentiation and logarithm opera-
tions are symmetric to that in additive share. For example,
in SecExp-Mul, the servers need firstly convert the input
to additive share, and the multiplicative share of output
is directly gotten after executing exponentiation operation
locally.
Algorithm 24 Secure exponentiation protocol SecExp-Mul
Input: Si has 〈x〉i, a base number a.
Output: Si gets 〈ax〉i.
Offline Phase :
1: T enough random numbers the sub-protocols use and
sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si collaboratively compute [[x]]i = SecMulRes(〈x〉i).
3: Si computes 〈ax〉i = a[[x]]i
Algorithm 25 Secure logarithm protocol SecLog-Mul
Input: Si has 〈x〉i, a base number a.
Output: Si gets 〈loga|x|〉i.
Offline Phase :
1: T enough random numbers the sub-protocols use and
sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si computes [[loga|x|]]i = loga|〈x〉i|
3: Si collaboratively compute 〈loga|x|〉i = SecAddRes(
[[loga|x|]]i).
9.2.4 Secure Trigonometric functions
It seems no useful identity which could directly support
the multiplicative share of the input of trigonometric. In
this case, we believe that the most reasonable way is still
transforming the input to additive share, and get the result
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TABLE 3: Communication complexity of protocols in MSS
Protocol Rounds Comm(bits)
SecAdd/SecSub 3 (4n+ 1)(n− 1)l
SecCmp-Mul 4 (4n+ 1)(n− 1)l + n(n− 1)
SecExp-Mul 1 n(n− 1)l
SecLog-Mul 1 (2n+ 1)(n− 1)l
SecPow-Mul 0 0
SecSin-Mul,cos 4 n(n− 1)2n−1l + (3n+ 1)(n− 1)l
tan,cot 4 n(n− 1)2nl + (6n+ 2)(n− 1)l
csc,sec 4 n(n− 1)2n−1l + (3n+ 1)(n− 1)l
SecArctan-Mul 9 (7n3 + 7
2
n2 − 19
2
n− 1)l
arcsin,arccos 18 (7n3 + 25
2
n2 − 43
2
n− 3)l
arcsec 16 (7n3 + 3
2
n2 − 33
2
n− 3)l
arccsc 18 (7n3 + 31
2
n2 − 39
2
n− 3)
arccot 11 (7n3 + 13
2
n2 − 25
2
n− 1)
with the help of SecAddRes. The total process is shown in
algorithm 26. The cosine process will be similar, due to the
support of multiplication, and other trigonometric functions
can be directly computed based on the results of sine and
cosine.
Algorithm 26 Secure sine/arctan protocol
SecSin-Mul/SecArctan-Mul
Input: Si has 〈θ〉i.
Output: Si gets 〈sin/arctan(θ)〉i.
Offline Phase :
1: T enough random numbers the sub-protocol uses and
sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si collaboratively compute [[θ]]i = SecMulRes(〈θ〉i).
3: Si collaboratively compute [[sin/arctan(θ)]]i =
SecSin/SecArctan([[θ]]i).
4: Si collaboratively compute 〈sin/arctan(θ)〉i =
SecAddRes([[sin/arctan(θ)]]i)
The overview of communication complexity in multi-
plicative share is shown in Table 3. It is easy to note that
multiplicative share only gets the advantages in the oper-
ations related to the power function. The exponentiation
and logarithm are the same consumption as ASS. In this
case, the tasks which mainly involve power function (e.g.,
multiplication or division) will be better when built on MSS.
However, we believe it is rare and ASS is one of the most
appropriate storage formats for the shares.
